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Abstract 
 
Given the indisputable cost of policy inaction in the run-up to banking crises as well as the negative 
side effects of unwarranted policy activation, policymakers would strongly benefit from early-
warning thresholds that more accurately predict crises and produce fewer false alarms. This paper 
presents a novel yet intuitive methodology to compute country-specific and state-dependent 
thresholds for early-warning indicators of banking crises. Our results for a selection of early-warning 
indicators for banking crises in 14 EU countries show that the benefits of applying the conditional 
moments approach can be substantial. The methodology provides more robust signals and 
improves the early-warning performance at the country-specific level, by accounting for country 
idiosyncrasies and state dependencies, which play an important role in national supervisory 
authorities’ macroprudential surveillance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the severe repercussions financial crises can have on the real economy, 
safeguarding financial stability has become a priority for supervisory authorities 
worldwide. Compared to normal recessions, Jorda et al. (2013) find that the recession path 
of real GDP per capita in financial recessions is 4% lower. In absolute terms, Cerra and 
Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b) estimate that financial crises lead to 
output losses in the order of, respectively, 7.5% and 9% of GDP.  
The more pronounced costs of financially driven recessions originate from the tight 
feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy, which can reinforce the 
economic dynamics after a negative shock. In particular, as shown by Kindleberger (1978), 
Schularik and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2013) and Aikman et al. (2015), excessive credit 
booms have a pivotal role in preceding banking crises and in worsening their effects on the 
real economy. Strong credit growth drives surges in asset prices1, and fuels borrowers’ 
leverage. With elevated levels of outstanding debt, the pro-cyclical behaviour of prices 
leads to debt-deflation effects, which can be detrimental in downturn phases of the cycle. 
The seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) 
affirmed the pivotal importance of leverage in amplifying economic fluctuations. In fact, 
Mian and Sufi (2010) find that high leverage is a powerful predictor of the severity of the 
downturn experienced during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Against this background, in the aftermath of the financial crisis increased attention was 
devoted, from policymakers and academics alike, to the role of macroprudential policies in 
safeguarding financial stability (e.g. Hanson et al., 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012). 
Leading international organisations (e.g. European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), 2014; 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2014) strongly encourage the development of sound 
macroprudential policy frameworks, involving the identification of leading indicators and 
associated thresholds signalling excessive developments that may lead to systemic risk. 
Therefore, the recent years saw the flourishing of a growing body of new research on 
early-warning indicators for the occurrence of banking crises. One of the most common 
methodologies used to identify early-warning indicators and obtain thresholds is the 
signalling approach, as introduced in the pioneering study by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). The signalling approach results in the computation of a threshold above which an 
indicator signals the potential occurrence of a banking crisis over the relevant prediction 
horizon. Several methodologies have been applied to the computation of thresholds in the 
signalling framework, such as non-parametric univariate and multivariate signalling (e.g. 
Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2011; Detken et al., 2014), discrete choice 
models (e.g., Babecký et al., 2013, 2014; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Behn et al., 2013; 
Lo Duca and Peltonen, 2013; Caggiano et al., 2014; Detken et al., 2014; Anundsen et al., 
2016; Caballero, 2016), and binary decision trees/random forests (e.g. Manasse and 
Roubini, 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2014).  
                                                 
1 On bubbles and crises, see for instance Allen and Gale (2000). 
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A common trait of all these studies is that, due to the scarcity of crisis events for individual 
countries, cross-country data is used to compute a single threshold for all countries in the 
sample. Similarly, there is a tendency towards establishing common rules for the activation 
of macroprudential policy instruments. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) suggests that national authorities should activate the countercyclical 
capital buffer when the deviation of credit to GDP from its backward looking trend (the so-
called credit to GDP gap) rises above two percentage points. 
But does “one size” fit all? Similarly to the debate on the adequacy of a single monetary 
policy for a set of heterogeneous countries2, a single early-warning threshold, considered 
to be optimal for a set of countries as a whole, could be sub-optimal at the individual 
country level. Structural differences across countries might warrant that rules for 
macroprudential policy activation be tailored to individual country needs. In their study on 
the operationalisation of the countercyclical capital buffer, Detken et al. (2014) highlight 
the need to further explore ways to account for country idiosyncrasies in early-warning 
models. Similarly, Davis and Karim (2008) conclude that pooled early-warning models for 
banking crises cannot be a substitute for country-specific macroprudential surveillance. 
Against this backdrop, this paper presents a novel yet intuitive methodology to compute 
country-specific and state-dependent thresholds for early-warning indicators of banking 
crises. A conditional moments approach is proposed, which builds on the simple 
comparison of the average level of an indicator in pre-crisis periods in crisis countries and 
the average level of the indicator in normal times. Accounting for the dispersion around 
these average indicator levels both across countries and over time, the method then 
determines the interval over which the optimal signalling threshold is searched. That is, 
compared to traditional non-parametric signalling, the conditional moments constrain the 
interval in which the optimal threshold is situated. This approach makes the thresholds 
more robust to the specification of the policymaker’s loss function (i.e. the objective 
function used to compute the optimal threshold) compared to the traditional early-warning 
threshold. Importantly, while relying on cross-country data, the methodology allows the 
interval and, therefore, the optimal threshold to be country-specific and state-dependent. 
Using panel data on a number of potential early-warning indicators for banking crises for 
14 EU countries, our results show that the benefits of applying the conditional moments 
approach with country specificities and state dependencies can be substantial. When 
evaluated in-sample, the model with country specificities and state dependencies is 
characterised by a better signalling performance than the traditional early-warning 
framework. In particular, for balanced preferences for Type I and Type II errors (θ=0.5), 
relative usefulness increases on average from 0.34 to 0.45. When more weight is attached 
to missing crises (θ=0.7), relative usefulness is on average 0.24 for the country-specific 
and state-dependent conditional moments compared to 0.13 for the traditional approach. 
Similarly, the noise to signal ratio is on average 0.39 compared to 0.44 for balanced 
preferences, and 0.59 compared to 0.81 when the aversion towards Type I errors is greater. 
The importance of accounting for country specificities and state dependencies is confirmed 
at the level of individual countries: country-specific and state-dependent conditional 
                                                 
2 See for instance Pirovano and Van Poeck (2011) and references therein. 
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moments result in a larger fraction of country/indicator pairs having a strictly positive 
relative usefulness relative to the traditional approach (80-90% compared to about 70%), 
and higher levels of relative usefulness for most country/indicator pairs. Similarly, when 
the aversion towards Type I errors is greater, country-specific and state-dependent 
conditional moments result in lower noise to signal ratios for almost all country/indicator 
pairs. More specifically, the fraction of country/indicator pairs with a noise to signal ratio 
lower than 0.5 amounts to almost 30% for conditional moments, whereas the equivalent 
figure for the traditional common approach is only about 10%. The role of country 
specificities and state dependencies is confirmed by an out-of-sample evaluation exercise. 
Overall, our results further show that the conditional moments-based thresholds and their 
signalling performance are more robust to the policymaker’s relative preference for 
missing crises versus issuing false alarms than the traditional thresholds. Therefore, this 
methodology provides more robust signals and improves the early-warning performance at 
the country-specific level, by accounting for country idiosyncrasies and state dependencies, 
which play an important role in national authorities’ macroprudential surveillance. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the signalling 
approach in the existing early-warning literature. Section 3 presents our novel conditional 
moments approach for determining country-specific and state-dependent early-warning 
thresholds. In Section 4 we present the data that are used for the empirical evaluation of the 
signalling performance of our methodology in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE SIGNALLING APPROACH IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
A great body of literature has been produced aiming at identifying useful early-warning 
indicators for the occurrence of crises. In recent years, a special attention has been devoted 
to early-warning models as starting point for the operationalization of macroprudential 
policies, such as countercyclical capital buffers (e.g. Drehmann et al., 2011; Detken et al., 
2014) and policy instruments targeting residential real estate (e.g. Ferrari et al. 2015). 
From a statistical standpoint, studies on early-warning indicators primarily rely on signal 
extraction methods. The signalling approach, pioneered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and extended by, inter alia, Alessi and Detken (2011) focuses on issuing signals ܵ௞,௧ at 
time t in country k whenever the value ௞ܻ,௧ of a given indicator breaches a pre-defined 
threshold ܶ:  
 
൝
ܵ௞,௧ ൌ 0	݂݅	 ௞ܻ,௧ ൑ ܶ																												
								ൌ 1	݂݅	 ௞ܻ,௧ ൐ ܶ
 
 
Then, the predictive abilities of the indicator can be evaluated by comparing the signal 
issued with actual observations. Once a signal is issued by an indicator, four possible 
outcomes can occur, classified in the so-called “Confusion Matrix” presented in Table 1. A 
signal is classified as correct if a crisis follows within the relevant prediction horizon (A); 
if a crisis does not follow, then the signal results in a false alarm (B). A non-issued signal 
is correct when a crisis does not follow (D) and it is incorrect when a crisis occurs (C). 
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Table 1: Confusion Matrix 
 Crisis No crisis 
Signal is issued A B 
Signal is not issued C D 
 
In several studies, optimal thresholds have been identified by minimising the noise to 
signal ratio, defined as the Type II error rate divided by one minus the Type I error rate: 
 
ܰܶܵ ൌ B/ሺB ൅ DሻC/ሺA ൅ Cሻ. 
 
Given the drawbacks of this approach3, Alessi and Detken (2011) propose to derive the 
optimal threshold by minimising a policymaker’s loss function:  
 
L ൌ θ ൬ CA ൅ C൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ θሻ ൬
B
B ൅ D൰, 
 
where parameter θ represents the policymaker’s relative preference for missing crises 
(Type I error) versus issuing false alarms (Type II error). Optimal threshold identification 
involves a trade-off between missing crises and issuing false alarms: a lower threshold 
decreases the Type I error rate but at the same time increases the Type II error rate.  
Given the optimal threshold value, evaluation measures for the signalling performance of 
the indicator can be calculated. Besides the noise to signal ratio, a commonly used measure 
is the relative usefulness, which expresses the policymaker’s gain from using the indicator 
or model for predicting crises compared to disregarding it and always (or never) issuing a 
signal.4 The relative usefulness measure takes the loss function as input and is defined as: 
 
ܴ݈݁ݑݏ ൌ ݉݅݊ሾߠ, ሺ1 െ ߠሻሿ െ ܮ݉݅݊ሾߠ, ሺ1 െ ߠሻሿ . 
 
The signalling approach has been applied in a variety of settings. Non-parametric 
applications involve grid searching for the optimal threshold over the set of possible 
values, determined by the cross-sectional and/or the time series distribution of the indicator 
(e.g. Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2011; Detken et al., 2014). Univariate 
or multivariate grid searches can be performed, but the latter face dimensionality problems. 
In a multivariate setting, Manasse and Roubini (2009) pioneered the use of classification 
and regression trees to predict financial crises, while Alessi and Detken (2014) extend this 
approach to a “random forest” framework. The parametric or regression approach, 
implemented inter alia by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and more recently by 
Babecký et al. (2013, 2014), Behn et al. (2013), Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013), Caggiano et 
                                                 
3 See for instance Drehmann et al. (2011). 
4 If a policymaker were to always issue a signal, the loss function would equal 1-θ. If a policymaker were to 
never issue a signal, the loss function would equal θ. Hence, the policymaker can always achieve a loss of 
݉݅݊ሾߠ, ሺ1 െ ߠሻሿ. The relative usefulness expresses the percentage reduction in the loss function of issuing 
signals on the basis of the indicator or model compared to the level ݉݅݊ሾߠ, ሺ1 െ ߠሻሿ. 
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al. (2014), Detken et al. (2014), Anundsen et al. (2016) and Caballero (2016), usually 
involves the regression of a binary dependent variable, equal to one in the relevant 
prediction horizon before the onset of a financial crisis, on a set of explanatory variables. 
The resulting predicted probabilities are then used to assess the early-warning properties of 
the model.5 
 
3. THE CONDITIONAL MOMENTS APPROACH FOR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
AND STATE-DEPENDENT EARLY-WARNING THRESHOLDS 
 
3.1. Overview of the conditional moments approach 
As mentioned above, optimal threshold identification involves a trade-off between missing 
crises and issuing false alarms. This trade-off is captured by the policymaker’s loss 
function, and the optimal threshold results from minimizing this loss function. In the 
traditional early warning approach, this optimization is performed through a grid search 
over a large number of potential threshold values. As an illustration, the upper left-hand 
panel of Figure 1 shows, for the credit to GDP gap, the Type I (blue line) and Type II (red 
line) error rate across all countries in the sample as a function of different potential 
threshold values, as well as the optimal threshold based on a policymaker’s loss function 
with equal weight on Type I and Type II errors. This optimal threshold for the credit to 
GDP gap equals 5.62, as denoted by the red dashed vertical line. 
Compared to this traditional approach of obtaining early-warning thresholds, the 
conditional moments approach proceeds in two steps. First, an interval over which the 
optimal threshold is searched is derived. Second, within this interval of potential threshold 
values, the optimal threshold is obtained in the same way as in the traditional approach, by 
trading off Type I and Type II errors across all countries in the sample in the minimization 
of the policymaker’s loss function. That is, compared to traditional non-parametric 
signalling, the conditional moments approach constrains the interval in which the optimal 
threshold is situated. This is illustrated in the lower left-hand panel of Figure 1, in which 
the black dashed vertical lines show that the range of possible values for the optimal 
threshold on the credit to GDP gap is restricted to the interval spanning from 2.27 to 9.12. 
The optimal conditional moments-based threshold for the credit to GDP gap amounts to 
5.62 (denoted by the black vertical line), which, given that no country specificities or state 
dependencies were introduced, coincides with the traditional common threshold in the 
upper left-hand panel of Figure 1. 
The economic intuition underlying the determination of the interval of potential threshold 
values in the first step assumes that indicator values (the credit to GDP gap in this 
example) below the lower bound of the interval (the left-hand black dashed vertical line) 
are consistent with “normal times”. Similarly, indicator values above the upper bound of 
the interval (the right-hand black dashed vertical line) are consistent with “pre-crisis 
periods”. Indicator values between these two thresholds, i.e. within the interval, may be 
                                                 
5 Ferrari et al. (2015) compare the performance of the non-parametric and parametric approach in the context 
of real estate-related banking crises. 
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associated both with normal times and pre-crisis periods. The optimal threshold is situated 
in this interval, where there is a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. 
To identify such bounds for the interval, the approach builds on the simple comparison of 
the average level (or first moment) of an indicator in pre-crisis periods in crisis countries 
and the average level of the indicator in normal times (i.e. the conditional moments). 
However, rather than using these conditional moments as bounds for the interval of 
potential threshold values, the method accounts for the dispersion around these average 
indicator levels both across countries and over time. More specifically, the distribution of 
both conditional moments is derived, and the bounds of the interval of potential thresholds 
are obtained by choosing the percentiles of the two distributions that minimize the 
policymaker’s loss function. In other words, both steps of the conditional moments 
approach, i.e. determining the interval of potential threshold values and selecting the 
optimal threshold in this interval, involve an optimization procedure. 
 
Figure 1: Situating the conditional moments approach 
Traditional common threshold Conditional moments country-specific threshold: 
country 1 
Conditional moments common threshold Conditional moments country-specific threshold: 
country 2 
Notes: The ascending blue line plots the Type I error as a function of the credit to GDP gap. The descending 
red line plots the Type II error as a function of the credit to GDP gap. The red dashed vertical line is the 
traditional early-warning threshold, whereas the black vertical lines are the optimal country-specific 
conditional moments-based thresholds. The bounds of the interval over which the latter is searched are 
indicated by the dashed black vertical lines. 
The conditional moments approach has two main advantages. First, constraining the 
interval over which the optimal threshold is searched makes the optimal threshold more 
robust to the specification of the policymaker’s loss function compared to the traditional 
early-warning threshold. Second, contrary to existing studies, while relying on cross-
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country data6, the methodology allows for deriving country-specific and state-dependent 
thresholds. 
In particular, as illustrated in the right-hand panels of Figure 1, the conditional moments 
and therefore the interval of potential threshold values can be made country-specific. The 
upper right-hand panel shows that the interval of potential thresholds for the credit to GDP 
gap in the country under consideration ranges from -1.06 to 7.25 (black dashed vertical 
lines). For the second country, the interval of potential thresholds for the credit to GDP gap 
ranges from 7.68 to 15.90 (black dashed vertical lines in the lower right-hand panel). The 
optimal country-specific thresholds for the credit to GDP gap are obtained as explained 
earlier, by trading off Type I and Type II errors across all countries in the sample in the 
minimization of the policymaker’s loss function. However, in this case, the grid of 
potential threshold values is country-specific. The resulting optimal threshold for the credit 
to GDP gap in the first country (the black vertical line in the upper right-hand panel) 
amounts to 2.29, which is lower than the traditional common threshold of 5.62 (indicated 
by the red dashed vertical line), but the latter is still situated in the interval from which the 
optimal conditional moments-based threshold is selected. The optimal threshold for the 
credit to GDP gap in the second country (black vertical line in the lower right-hand panel) 
amounts to 12.46, which is substantially larger than the traditional common threshold. In 
fact, the traditional threshold is no longer in the interval from which the optimal threshold 
is selected. 
Figure 2 illustrates the benefits of the country-specific conditional moments-based 
thresholds in this example. The upper panels plot the credit to GDP gap over time for the 
two countries considered in the illustration. The values of the credit to GDP gap are 
considered in relation to two early warning thresholds: the traditional threshold, which is 
equal to 5.62 (red dashed line) in both cases, and the country-specific threshold obtained 
from the conditional moments (2.29 in country 1 and 12.46 in country 2, black line). When 
the credit to GDP gap exceeds the respective thresholds, a signal is issued. This signal is 
correct when the country is in a pre-crisis period (indicated by the grey shaded areas), and 
a false alarm if the country is in normal times.  
  
                                                 
6 Using cross-country information ensures a sufficient coverage of crisis events in the sample. In case a 
sufficient amount of crisis events were available for an individual country, the method could obviously also 
be applied to that individual country. 
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Figure 2: Benefits of accounting for country specificities 
Credit to GDP gap and thresholds: country 1 Credit to GDP gap and thresholds: country 2 
Type I and Type II errors: country 1 Type I and Type II errors: country 2 
Notes: The blue line plots the credit to GDP gap over time. The red dashed horizontal line in the upper 
panels is the traditional early-warning threshold, whereas the black horizontal lines in the upper panels are 
the optimal country-specific conditional moments-based thresholds. The red areas below (above) the black 
horizontal line in the lower panels plot Type I (Type II) errors from signals obtained on the basis of the 
traditional threshold. The black areas below (above) the black horizontal line in the lower panels plot Type I 
(Type II) errors from signals obtained on the basis of the country-specific conditional moments-based 
threshold.  
The lower panels in Figure 2 classify the signals received from the credit to GDP gap 
based on the two thresholds. Type I errors are plotted below the horizontal black line, 
while Type II errors are plotted above the horizontal black line. The left-hand panel shows 
that the lower country-specific threshold results in false alarms (the black area above the 
horizontal line) somewhat more often. On the other hand, it does identify both crises, 
whereas the traditional threshold largely fails to predict the second crisis (the red area 
below the horizontal line). The right-hand panel illustrates that the higher country-specific 
threshold for country 2 reduces the Type II error (smaller black than red area above the 
horizontal line), while at the same time not resulting in a larger Type I error. 
Given the indisputable cost of policy inaction in the run-up to banking crises as well as the 
negative side effects of unwarranted policy activation, policy makers would strongly 
benefit from early-warning thresholds that more accurately predict crises and produce 
fewer false alarms. Such thresholds can be obtained by accounting for country specificities 
and state dependencies. While in principle, thresholds could be estimated on the basis of 
data for individual countries, crisis events in individual countries are too scarce to derive 
robust early-warning thresholds.  
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The conditional moments approach proposed in this paper fulfils the need for early-
warning methodologies that identify robust country-specific thresholds in empirical 
settings that exploit pre-crisis information available in cross-country data. The estimation 
of thresholds under the conditional moments approach is further explained in the following 
two subsections. Before detailing the two-step procedure of deriving the optimal threshold, 
i.e. determining the interval over which the optimal threshold is searched in the first step 
and obtaining the optimal threshold in the second step, we explain how the conditional 
moments that are underlying the first step are estimated. 
 
3.2. Estimating the conditional moments 
To obtain the conditional moments, the sample of observations is divided in two 
subsamples: a “pre-crisis sample” and a “normal sample”. Given a prediction horizon of 1 
to 3 years before a banking crisis7, observations in a window of 5 to 12 quarters before the 
onset of a banking crisis in countries that experienced a banking crisis are assigned to the 
pre-crisis sample. The remaining observations are part of the normal sample. The 
comparison between the conditional moments, i.e. the first moment of the pre-crisis sample 
and the normal sample, shows whether an indicator assumes, on average, higher levels 
before an imminent banking crisis than in normal times.  
While these moments can be estimated non-parametrically8, we apply the method in a 
linear regression framework. The baseline specification of the linear regression model is: 
 
௞ܻ,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵpre-crisis௞,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௧                                          (1) 
 
where ௞ܻ,௧ is the level of the early-warning indicator under consideration (e.g. the credit to 
GDP gap)9 at time t in country k, pre-crisis௞,௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
observation at time t in country k is in the pre-crisis subsample and zero otherwise, and ߝ௞,௧ 
is an error term. The pooled conditional moments are then obtained as follows: 
 
ܧൣ ௞ܻ,௧|normal௞,௧ ൌ 1൧ ൌ ߙ଴ 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|pre-crisis௞,௧ ൌ 1ቃ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ 
 
Note that the estimated coefficients ߙ଴ and ߙଵ do not have a country-specific subscript, i.e. 
the pooled conditional moments are common across countries and time-invariant, 
estimated using pooled information only, relying on both cross-country and time variation 
                                                 
7 This window is situated sufficiently close to historical crisis events so that the early-warning information 
contained in the indicators can be extracted, while at the same time providing sufficiently timely signals, 
which leave the policy maker sufficient time to take remedial action. 
8 See Ferrari and Pirovano (2014) for an implementation of an embryonic version of the methodology in a 
non-parametric framework. 
9 The methodology can also be implemented in a discrete choice framework. In this case, ௞ܻ,௧ would be the 
predicted probability of an estimated logit model regressing a dummy equal to 1 in the 5th to 12th quarter 
before the onset of a banking crisis on a series of potential early-warning indicators. The methodology can 
then be used to compute signalling thresholds for the predicted logit probabilities. 
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in the data. Hence, the pooled approach would result in common threshold for all countries 
and time periods in the sample. 
The method is easily extended to account for country-specificities and/or state 
dependencies by adding country-specific and/or time-varying control variables ܺ௞,௧௜ :  
 
௞ܻ,௧ ൌ ൫ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜,௞normal൯ ൅ ቀߙଵ ൅ ∑ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜,௞pre-crisisቁ pre-crisis௞,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௧ (2) 
 
The country-specific and state-dependent conditional moments for country k at time t are 
obtained as follows: 
 
ܧൣ ௞ܻ,௧|normal௞,௧ ൌ 1, ܺ௞,௧௜ ൧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅෍ܺ௞,௧௜
௜
ߛ௜,௞normal 
ܧ ቂ ௞ܻ,௧|pre-crisis௞,௧ ൌ 1, ܺ௞,௧௜ ቃ ൌ ൭ߙ଴ ൅෍ܺ௞,௧௜
௜
ߛ௜,௞normal൱ ൅ ൭ߙଵ ൅෍ܺ௞,௧௜
௜
ߛ௜,௞pre-crisis൱ 
 
Hence, the control variables ܺ௞,௧௜  make the conditional moments country-specific and/or 
time-varying, resulting in country-specific and/or time-varying signalling thresholds. 
Country dummy variables are the most straightforward way of accounting for country-
specificities. In particular, the simple country dummy variables, resulting in the parameter 
estimates ߛ௜,௞normal, account for differences in the average level of ௞ܻ,௧ across countries. The 
country dummies capture structural cross-country differences that may lead to different 
average levels in the early-warning indicator (e.g. the credit to GDP gap) under 
consideration. The interactions of these dummy variables with the pre-crisis dummy, 
resulting in the parameter estimates ߛ௜,௞pre-crisis, account for differences in the average level of 
௞ܻ,௧ in pre-crisis periods in countries that experienced a crisis. These effects are illustrated 
in the left-hand panel of Figure 3: the dashed blue lines correspond to the estimated 
coefficients of model (1), while the solid green lines correspond to the estimated 
coefficients of model (2) where ܺ௞,௧௜  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for country k. The 
country dummies do not result in time variation in the thresholds, but do result in different 
levels across countries. 
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Figure 3: Effect of country dummies and control variables on Yk 
Country dummies Control variables 
 
Notes: The blue dashed horizontal lines present the pooled conditional moments. The green lines show the 
effect of introducing country dummies and continuous control variables, respectively, in the conditional 
moments equation.  
Continuous control variables, on the other hand, account for the fact that the average effect 
of ௞ܻ,௧ might differ according to developments in countries’ macro-financial features. 
When ܺ௞,௧௜  is a control variable, the parameter estimate ߛ௜,௞normal represents the marginal 
effect of the control variable ܺ௞,௧௜  when it assumes a specific value ݔ௞,௧௜ . A value ߛ௜,௞normal>0, 
as assumed in the right-hand panel of Figure 3, implies that the average level of ௞ܻ,௧ 
increases for larger values of ܺ௞,௧௜ . The interactions of these control variables with the pre-
crisis dummy, resulting in the parameter estimates ߛ௜,௞pre-crisis, account for differences in the 
average level of ௞ܻ,௧ for different values of ܺ௞,௧௜ 	in pre-crisis periods in countries that 
experienced a crisis. It is important to note that when time-varying control variables are 
included in the model, the estimated conditional moments will be time-varying, depending 
on the specific point in time chosen for evaluating ܺ௞,௧௜ . That is, the derived early-warning 
thresholds will not only be country-specific, but are also state-dependent. 
Note that, in contrast to ߙ଴ and ߙଵ, the estimated coefficients ߛ௜,௞normal  and ߛ௜,௞pre-crisis can be 
country-specific. This is obviously the case for country dummies, but country-specific 
coefficients may also be identified for time-varying control variables from the country-
specific time variation in the data. In the remainder of the paper, ܺ௞,௧௜  consists of either 
country dummies only or country dummies in combination with time-varying control 
variables that capture the countries’ business cycle. As robust identification of country-
specific coefficients of control variables (both country dummies and time-varying control 
variables) interacted with the pre-crisis dummy is only possible if the sample contains a 
sufficient number of crises in the individual countries, we do not consider the interaction of 
control variables with the pre-crisis dummy in our empirical application. Instead, the 
reported results will be on the basis of the following model: 
 
௞ܻ,௧ ൌ ൫ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ܺ௞,௧௜௜ ߛ௜,௞normal൯ ൅ ߙଵpre-crisis௞,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௧  (3) 
 
This model allows for country-specific and time-varying levels of the conditional 
moments, but the difference between the moment for the “pre-crisis” sample and the one 
for the “normal” sample is common across countries and time-invariant. 
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3.3. Determining thresholds 
As explained above, thresholds are determined in two steps. First, the method accounts for 
the dispersion around the conditional moments (the first moments of the pre-crisis and 
normal subsamples) in order to determine the interval of potential threshold values. 
Second, the optimal threshold is selected from the values in this interval. 
 
3.3.1. Interval of potential threshold values 
For the derivation of the interval of potential thresholds in the first step we introduce the 
concepts of the “pre-crisis zone” and the “normal zone”; the bounds of the pre-crisis zone 
and the normal zone will in fact determine the bounds of the interval of potential threshold 
values.  
The bounds of the pre-crisis zone and the normal zone are derived from the distributions of 
the respective conditional moments, i.e. the distribution of the first moment of the normal 
sample and the distribution of the first moment of the pre-crisis sample. These distributions 
are obtained by applying the delta method to equation (1) or (3).10 We consider as the 
normal zone those indicator levels ௞ܻ,௧ below the ݌௡௢௥௠௔௟-th percentile of the distribution 
of the first moment of the normal sample. We consider as the pre-crisis zone those 
indicator levels ௞ܻ,௧ above the ݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦-th percentile of the distribution of the first 
moment of the pre-crisis sample. That is, the upper bound of the normal zone, ܷ௞,௧௡௢௥௠௔௟, 
coincides with the ݌௡௢௥௠௔௟-th percentile of the distribution of the first moment of the 
normal sample and the lower bound of the pre-crisis zone, ܮ௞,௧௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦, coincides with the 
݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦-th percentile of the distribution of the first moment of the pre-crisis sample. 
The interval of potential threshold values is given by [ ௞ܶ,௧ଵ , ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ]. Indicator levels below 
௞ܶ,௧ଵ ൌ ݉݅݊൫ܷ௞,௧௡௢௥௠௔௟, ܮ௞,௧௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦൯ are situated in the normal zone and not in the pre-crisis 
zone, and therefore, consistent with “normal times”. Indicator values that are situated 
above ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ൌ ݉ܽݔ൫ܷ௞,௧௡௢௥௠௔௟, ܮ௞,௧௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦൯ are in the pre-crisis zone and at the same time not 
in the normal zone, and therefore, consistent with “pre-crisis periods”. Values between ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  
and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  may be associated with both normal times and pre-crisis periods. 
As mentioned, the bounds of the interval of potential threshold values ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  are 
determined by the ݌௡௢௥௠௔௟-th percentile of the distribution of the first moment of the 
normal sample and the ݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦-th percentile of the distribution of the first moment of 
the pre-crisis sample (also see Figure 4 in Section 3.4). While the levels ݌௡௢௥௠௔௟ and 
݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦ could be set to ad-hoc levels based on economic intuition (e.g. 95 and 5, 
respectively), we opt for selecting them optimally by minimizing the policymaker’s loss 
function. 
                                                 
10 The delta method allows computing the standard errors of the conditional moments on the basis of the 
standard errors of the estimated regression coefficients in equation (1) or (3), which, under the normality 
assumption, can be used to derive the distributions of the conditional moments. The less significant the 
regression coefficients in equation (1) or (3), the wider will be the distribution of the conditional moments. 
Alternatively, a bootstrap procedure could be applied, in which equation (1) or (3) is estimated many times 
on random samples to obtain the distributions of the conditional moments. 
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To this end, the bounds of the interval for potential threshold values, ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ , are 
mapped into three signalling zones for the indicator. In particular, for indicator levels 
below ௞ܶ,௧ଵ , which are consistent with normal times, no signal is issued. Indicator values 
that are situated above ௞ܶ,௧ଶ , which are consistent with pre-crisis periods, lead to the 
issuance of a strong signal. Values between ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  may be associated with both 
normal times and pre-crisis periods, trigger the issuance of an intermediate signal, with the 
strength of the signal increasing linearly when moving from ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  to ௞ܶ,௧ଶ . Compared to 
levels above ௞ܶ,௧ଶ , which trigger a strong signal, levels between	 ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  will provide an 
earlier signal (smaller Type I error), but also with the risk of more false alarms (larger 
Type II error). Therefore only an intermediate signal is issued between ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ . In 
particular, the strength of the signal ܵ௞,௧ for country k received at time t is 
 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܵ௞,௧ ൌ 0	݂݅	 ௞ܻ,௧ ൑ ௞ܶ,௧ଵ
																												ൌ ௒ೖ,೟ି ೖ்,೟భ
ೖ்,೟మ ି ೖ்,೟భ
	݂݅	 ௞ܶ,௧ଵ ൑ 	 ௞ܻ,௧ ൑ ௞ܶ,௧ଶ
				ൌ 1	݂݅	 ௞ܻ,௧ ൒ ௞ܶ,௧ଶ
  (4) 
 
Given the strength of the signal in expression (4), the thresholds ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  can be chosen 
optimally by minimizing the policymaker’s loss function in function of ݌௡௢௥௠௔௟ and 
݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦. Note that the search for the optimal percentiles results in an optimal	݌௡௢௥௠௔௟ 
and ݌௣௥௘ି௖௥௜௦௜௦ that is common to all countries and time periods in the sample. However, 
the distributions from which these optimal percentiles are taken may be country-specific 
and state-dependent, thereby resulting in country-specific and time-varying bounds ( ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  
and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ) of the interval from which the optimal threshold will be selected. That is, the 
interval of potential threshold can vary across countries and over time. 
 
3.3.2. Optimal threshold 
In the next step, the optimal threshold ௞ܶ,௧∗  is derived by minimizing the policymaker’s loss 
function, conditional on ௞ܶ,௧∗  being situated between	 ௞ܶ,௧ଵ 	and	 ௞ܶ,௧ଶ . That is, while the method 
follows exactly the same approach as used for determining the traditional threshold, in this 
case the range of values over which the optimal threshold is searched is limited to the area 
ൣ ௞ܶ,௧ଵ , ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ൧ rather than the entire range of indicator levels. As shown in Section 5, this has 
the advantage of resulting in an optimal signalling threshold that is more robust to the 
choice of the preference parameter θ in the policymaker’s loss function. Furthermore, as 
explained above, country-specificities and state dependencies can be introduced, resulting 
in an optimal threshold that is allowed to vary across countries and over time. 
 
3.4. Multi-threshold monitoring framework 
While an optimal threshold ௞ܶ,௧∗  is derived in the conditional moments approach, the 
methodology results in a multi-threshold early-warning monitoring framework. In the 
traditional approach, the single threshold identifies two states: a signal is issued when the 
indicator exceeds the threshold, and no signal is issued otherwise. In contrast, the presence 
of three signalling zones determined by thresholds ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  provides policymakers 
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with more granular signals of different intensity. In particular, for indicator levels below 
௞ܶ,௧ଵ , which are consistent with normal times, no signal is issued. Indicator values that are 
situated above ௞ܶ,௧ଶ , which are consistent with pre-crisis periods, lead to the issuance of a 
strong signal. Values between ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ  may be associated with both normal times and 
pre-crisis periods, trigger the issuance of an intermediate signal, with the strength of the 
signal increasing linearly when moving from ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  to ௞ܶ,௧ଶ . Hence, as illustrated in the right-
hand panel of Figure 4, an indicator breaching the lower threshold ௞ܶ,௧ଵ  could be a signal for 
policymakers to start an in-depth analysis of the identified vulnerability and consider 
policy options for potential implementation when a stronger signal, in the form of 
breaching the optimal threshold ௞ܶ,௧∗ , is received. Furthermore, the strength of the signal 
received once the optimal threshold is breached, i.e. being in the orange zone (between ௞ܶ,௧∗  
and ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ) or in the red zone (above ௞ܶ,௧ଶ ), could be used as input in the calibration of the 
policy measure. 
 
Figure 4: Multi-threshold monitoring framework 
 
 
4.  DATA 
The empirical analysis is based on 14 countries: 12 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and 
three EU countries (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) in the period ranging 
from 1970 to 2015.  Two types of variables are needed to perform the analysis: a set of 
potential leading indicators whose early-warning properties are tested, and information on 
the onset of banking crises in the relevant countries.  
 
4.1. Early-warning indicators and control variables 
As the aim of the paper is to illustrate the benefits of our new methodology rather than to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of potential early-warning indicators for banking crises, we 
opt for a limited set of indicators that is known to have relatively good signalling 
performance: indicators related to the supply of credit and indicators related to residential 
real estate prices. 
Credit supply indicators, sourced from the BIS database, encompass broad credit to the 
private sector, bank credit and credit granted to households (HH), expressed as a 
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percentage of GDP. For the indicators of real estate prices, we rely on OECD data on 
nominal real estate prices and the nominal real estate price-to-income ratio (the latter 
expressed in percentage deviations from the all-sample average). Data on the total debt 
service ratio and the debt service ratio of households are sourced from the dataset used by 
Detken et al. (2014) for their analysis on indicator selection and threshold identification for 
the operationalisation of the countercyclical capital buffer. Other than the levels of 
indicators, we consider the year-on-year growth rate and the gap from the backward-
looking trend, referred to as “gap”11. The data for the 14 countries are at a quarterly 
frequency ranging from 1970Q1 to 2015Q3 for the series with the longest coverage. One 
quarter lags are implemented for all variables (except for market variables), to account for 
publication lags. The top panel of Table 2 provides summary statistics of the 14 selected 
indicators. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of early-warning indicators (ࢅ) and control variables (ࢄ) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Early-warning indicators 
Bank credit to GDP gap 1645 3.45 9.79 -41.20 42.84 
Broad credit to GDP gap 1645 5.87 13.38 -33.71 88.14 
Broad HH credit to GDP gap 1465 1.30 4.71 -22.80 15.53 
Nominal bank credit growth 1643 0.09 0.07 -0.22 0.42 
Nominal broad credit growth 1643 0.09 0.06 -0.10 0.40 
Nominal broad HH credit growth 1437 0.10 0.08 -0.07 0.41 
Debt service ratio 1610 18.13 5.62 8.53 43.72 
Debt service ratio growth 1598 0.33 1.42 -8.53 6.73 
HH debt service ratio 1229 13.05 5.23 4.87 29.25 
HH debt service ratio growth 1186 0.32 0.95 -3.60 4.03 
Nominal RRE price gap 1586 1.86 9.29 -51.77 32.64 
Nominal RRE price growth 1579 0.06 0.08 -0.21 0.71 
Price to income 1464 100.84 21.51 60.75 177.34 
Change in price to income 1441 0.01 0.07 -0.20 0.33 
Control variables 
real GDP growth 1645 2.26 2.74 -10.20 15.60 
inflation rate 1645 3.54 3.16 -6.11 21.80 
3 month money market rate 1645 6.12 4.49 0.16 45.66 
equity price growth 1645 0.10 0.28 -0.65 1.91 
Notes: Gaps are calculated as the deviation from the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with λ=400,000. Price to income levels are expressed as the percentage deviation of 
the all-sample country-level average. 
 
Similarly, the aim of this paper is not to find the optimal set of control variables for each 
indicator in the sample, but rather to show that, for a given set of control variables, the 
conditional moments approach that incorporates country specificities and state 
dependencies may improve signalling performance. When estimating the model as 
specified in equation (2), the following control variables are considered: the year-on-year 
                                                 
11 Gaps are calculated as the deviation from the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ=400,000. 
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growth of real GDP, inflation, nominal equity prices growth and the nominal 3-month 
market rate12. These variables aim at capturing the business cycle, developments on 
financial markets as well as the stance of monetary policy. Summary statistics are provided 
in the bottom panel of Table 2.  
 
4.2. Identification of banking crises 
The starting dates of banking crises reported in Table 3 are based on a combination of 
several recent sources, including Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012), Behn et al. (2013), 
Babecký et al. (2014), Detken et al. (2014) and Anundsen et al. (2016). After controlling 
for the availability of data for the control variables in Table 2, our sample covers 19 
banking crisis episodes. 
 
Table 3: List of banking crises 
Start date Countries 
1974Q2 Germany 
1987Q1 Denmark 
1990Q3 Sweden 
1991Q1 Finland, United Kingdom 
1994Q1 France, Italy 
2007Q1 United Kingdom 
2008Q1 France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
2008Q3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden 
Source: The starting dates of banking crises are based on a 
combination of several recent sources, including Laeven and 
Valencia (2008, 2012), Behn et al. (2013), Babecký et al. 
(2014), Detken et al. (2014) and Anundsen et al. (2016). 
 
Of these 19 crisis episodes, two thirds are clustered around the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis, while seven crisis episodes occurred before the global financial crisis and tend to be 
clustered in the period from the late eighties to the mid-nineties. While banking and 
financial crises tend to share a number of similarities in terms of economic growth 
patterns, asset price inflation, credit growth and debt accumulation in the run-up, each one 
presents distinctive features regarding specific causes, nature and severity (e.g. Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008; Connolly, 2009). This heterogeneity is reflected in our crisis sample, 
which contains both systemic banking crises affecting large parts of countries’ banking 
systems (e.g., the Nordic crisis in the early nineties, the global financial crisis) and less 
systemic more isolated events (e.g., Germany in the seventies, the Danish crisis at the end 
of the eighties, the crises in France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the nineties). 
The information on the starting dates of the crises is used to generate the “pre-crisis” 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in the 12 to 5 quarters prior to the onset of a crisis, set 
to missing during the 4 quarters prior to a crisis and the 12 quarters starting from the onset 
                                                 
12 Data on control variables is sourced from the OECD database. 
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of the crisis13, and to 0 in all remaining quarters. Consequently, the “normal” sample 
includes all observations for which the “pre-crisis” dummy is set to zero.  
 
5.  RESULTS 
In this section we present the results of the empirical approach outlined above. Based on an 
in-sample exercise, we compare the signalling performance of the optimal thresholds 
obtained with our novel methodology to that of the traditional common thresholds and 
show how country-specificities and state dependencies can improve early-warning 
performance. Furthermore, we show that conditional moments-based thresholds are more 
robust to the choice of the preference parameter θ in the policymaker’s loss function. 
Finally, we perform an out-of-sample exercise to assess the robustness of the main 
findings. 
 
5.1. In-sample evaluation 
In the in-sample case, the conditional moments and associated optimal thresholds are 
estimated over the sample ranging from 1970Q1 to 2012Q4, and their signalling 
performance is evaluated over the aforementioned prediction sample. Results are provided 
on the signalling performance computed both across all countries in the sample (Tables 4-
6) and at the level of the individual countries in the sample (Figure 5). 
Table 4 compares, for balanced preferences for Type I and Type II errors (θ=0.5), the 
relative usefulness of thresholds based on different versions of the conditional moments to 
the traditional common threshold. The columns under “CM pooled” show the results when 
the conditional moments of the pre-crisis sample and the normal sample are estimated on 
the basis of equation (1); the results in the columns named “CM country dummies” and 
“CM country dummies and controls” are based on conditional moments obtained from 
equation (3), estimated respectively with country dummies and country dummies plus 
control variables capturing the state of the business cycle. 
  
                                                 
13 The behavior of economic indicators is markedly different in crisis times than in normal times. Since the 
objective is to compare the average evolution of indicators in pre-crisis and normal times, crisis quarters are 
dropped from the sample. 
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Table 4: Traditional vs conditional moments: relative usefulness (θ=0.5)  
  Observations  Traditional  CM pooled 
CM country 
dummies 
CM country 
dummies and 
controls 
Indicator 
Pre‐
crisis  Normal 
Thres‐
hold  Relus 
Thres‐
hold  Relus 
Thres‐
hold  Relus 
Thres‐ 
hold  Relus 
Bank credit to GDP gap  144  1182  8.03  0.31  8.03  0.31  1.49  0.36  4.79  0.49 
Broad credit to GDP gap  144  1182  5.62  0.29  5.62  0.29  4.42  0.34  5.53  0.39 
Broad HH credit to GDP 
gap  144  1015  1.05  0.38  1.05  0.38  1.45  0.42  1.65  0.53 
Nominal bank credit 
growth  144  1180  0.11  0.26  0.11  0.26  0.13  0.34  0.13  0.43 
Nominal broad credit 
growth  144  1180  0.14  0.23  0.13  0.23  0.14  0.24  0.11  0.26 
Nominal broad HH 
credit growth  141  990  0.10  0.34  0.10  0.31  0.12  0.29  0.14  0.38 
Debt service ratio  136  1155  19.44  0.31  19.44  0.31  17.88  0.44  16.50  0.46 
Debt service ratio 
growth  136  1147  0.63  0.43  0.63  0.43  0.39  0.43  0.29  0.44 
HH debt service ratio  128  829  11.83  0.29  11.83  0.29  11.65  0.42  12.37  0.55 
HH debt service ratio 
growth  128  786  0.69  0.43  0.69  0.43  0.38  0.45  0.59  0.45 
Nominal RRE price gap  144  1123  8.71  0.43  8.71  0.43  3.60  0.45  4.01  0.53 
Nominal RRE price 
growth  144  1116  0.10  0.31  0.10  0.31  0.09  0.32  0.09  0.41 
Price to income  136  1026  111.78  0.39  111.80  0.39  115.68  0.45  105.98  0.63 
Price to income growth  135  1004  0.06  0.32  0.06  0.32  0.01  0.32  0.03  0.36 
Average  139  1065  0.34  0.34  0.38    0.45 
Notes: “Traditional” shows the results for the traditional common threshold. “CM pooled” shows the results 
when the conditional moments of the pre-crisis sample and the normal sample are estimated on the basis of 
equation (1); the results in the columns named “CM country dummies” and “CM country dummies and 
controls” are based on conditional moments obtained from equation (3), estimated respectively with country 
dummies and country dummies plus control variables capturing the state of the business cycle. 
“Observations” is the number of quarterly observations in the evaluation sample. “Relus” is relative 
usefulness. 
 
For balanced preferences, thresholds derived from the pooled conditional moments 
approach are identical to the traditional common thresholds, resulting in the same early-
warning performance. This is not surprising, since whereas the traditional approach 
searches for the optimal threshold over the entire data range, the conditional moments 
approach constrains the interval in which the optimal threshold is situated. Therefore, when 
conditional moments do not include country specificities and are time-invariant, we do not 
expect to obtain thresholds much different from the traditional ones. 
Adding country dummies in the estimation of the conditional moments of the pre-crisis 
sample and the normal sample in equation (3) improves the relative usefulness on average 
from 0.34 to 0.38. The improvement is quite substantial for the debt service ratio variables 
(in levels), bank credit growth, price to income and the credit gap variables. When adding 
to the country dummies in equation (3) state dependencies as captured by the four control 
variables discussed in Section 4, relative usefulness shows an even stronger average 
improvement (from 0.34 to 0.45). State dependencies result in a further improvement of 
the relative usefulness for almost all variables compared to the case with only country 
dummies. 
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Table 5: Traditional vs conditional moments: noise to signal (θ=0.5)  
  Observations  Traditional  CM pooled 
CM country 
dummies 
CM country 
dummies and 
controls 
Indicator 
Pre‐
crisis  Normal 
Thres‐
hold  NTS 
Thres‐
hold  NTS 
Thres‐
hold  NTS 
Thres‐ 
hold  NTS 
Bank credit to GDP gap  144  1182  8.03  0.36  8.03  0.36  1.49  0.58  4.79  0.36 
Broad credit to GDP gap  144  1182  5.62  0.53  5.62  0.53  4.42  0.56  5.53  0.47 
Broad HH credit to GDP 
gap  144  1015  1.05  0.53  1.05  0.53  1.45  0.50  1.65  0.39 
Nominal bank credit 
growth  144  1180  0.11  0.57  0.11  0.57  0.13  0.41  0.13  0.23 
Nominal broad credit 
growth  144  1180  0.14  0.48  0.13  0.51  0.14  0.45  0.11  0.54 
Nominal broad HH credit 
growth  141  990  0.10  0.59  0.10  0.59  0.12  0.57  0.14  0.30 
Debt service ratio  136  1155  19.44  0.42  19.44  0.42  17.88  0.40  16.50  0.52 
Debt service ratio 
growth  136  1147  0.63  0.40  0.63  0.40  0.39  0.47  0.29  0.49 
HH debt service ratio  128  829  11.83  0.57  11.83  0.57  11.65  0.53  12.37  0.36 
HH debt service ratio 
growth  128  786  0.69  0.37  0.69  0.37  0.38  0.49  0.59  0.37 
Nominal RRE price gap  144  1123  8.71  0.20  8.71  0.20  3.60  0.41  4.01  0.31 
Nominal RRE price 
growth  144  1116  0.10  0.44  0.10  0.43  0.09  0.49  0.09  0.39 
Price to income  136  1026  111.78  0.30  111.80  0.30  115.68  0.19  105.98  0.19 
Price to income growth  135  1004  0.06  0.38  0.06  0.38  0.01  0.63  0.03  0.48 
Average  139  1065  0.44  0.44  0.48    0.39 
Notes: “Traditional” shows the results for the traditional common threshold. “CM pooled” shows the results 
when the conditional moments of the pre-crisis sample and the normal sample are estimated on the basis of 
equation (1); the results in the columns under “CM country dummies” and “CM country dummies and 
controls” are based on conditional moments estimated on the basis of equation (3), with country dummies 
respectively country dummies and control variables capturing the state of the business cycle included. 
“Observations” is the number of quarterly observations in the evaluation sample. “NTS” is the noise to 
signal ration. 
 
In Table 5 the signalling performance of the conditional moments is compared (for θ=0.5) 
to that of the traditional common threshold in terms of noise to signal ratio. Adding 
country-specificities in the form of country dummies results in an improvement of the 
noise to signal ratio for about half of the indicators (most substantially for bank credit 
growth, price to income, broad credit growth and the HH debt service ratio). However, 
despite a status quo or improvement in relative usefulness, noise to signal ratios deteriorate 
dramatically for a number of variables, such as price to income growth, bank credit to GDP 
gap and RRE price gap. This is due to the fact that the trade-off between Type I and Type 
II errors is different in the noise to signal ratio than in the relative usefulness specification. 
On average, the country-specific conditional moments result in a substantially smaller 
Type I error (26% compared to 39%, not reported) than the traditional threshold, but at the 
same time in a larger Type II error (36% compared to 27%, not reported). While this 
improves the average relative usefulness from (0.34 to 0.38, see Table 4), the average 
performance in terms of noise to signal ratios (from 0.44 to 0.48) in fact worsens. 
When also adding control variables, the improvement in relative usefulness compared to 
the traditional threshold is accompanied by a reduction of the average noise to signal ratio 
(from 0.44 to 0.39). Compared to the conditional moments with country dummies only, 
state dependencies reduce the Type II error on average from 36% to 29% (not reported). 
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The noise to signal ratio particularly improves for bank and HH credit growth, the 
household credit gap and the price to income ratio. 
The results presented so far clearly show that the benefits of applying the conditional 
moments approach with country specificities and state dependencies can be substantial, 
albeit signalling performance is not improved for all indicators considered. The preference 
parameter θ set at 0.5 implies that the policymaker is indifferent between incurring a Type 
I and a Type II error. However, with the recent financial crisis still fresh in their memory, 
policymakers might be more averse towards missing crises, since they might consider the 
cost of banking crises to be larger than the cost society would incur in case of 
macroprudential policies unwarrantedly implemented. Table 6 shows the results of a 
robustness check against a higher preference parameter (θ=0.7), i.e. imposing more weight 
on the risk of missing crises than on false alarms in the policymaker’s loss function. 
 
Table 6: Robustness to choice of preference parameter: θ=0.7  
  Observations  Traditional common  CM pooled 
CM country 
dummies 
CM country 
dummies and 
controls 
Indicator  Pre‐crisis  Normal  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus 
Bank credit to GDP gap  144  1182  0.79  0.08  0.65  ‐0.19  0.65  0.21  0.57  0.22 
Broad credit to GDP gap  144  1182  0.88  0.12  0.65  ‐0.15  0.65  0.07  0.54  0.12 
Broad HH credit to GDP 
gap  144  1015  0.61  0.23  0.59  0.16  0.58  0.29  0.43  0.38 
Nominal bank credit 
growth  144  1180  0.95  0.05  0.72  ‐0.26  0.81  ‐0.18  0.69  0.07 
Nominal broad credit 
growth  144  1180  0.98  0.02  0.53  ‐0.47  0.90  ‐0.39  0.80  ‐0.11 
Nominal broad HH 
credit growth  141  990  0.71  0.13  0.59  ‐0.01  0.73  ‐0.02  0.69  0.02 
Debt service ratio  136  1155  0.90  0.10  0.67  ‐0.18  0.58  0.24  0.57  0.41 
Debt service ratio 
growth  136  1147  0.60  0.28  0.59  0.23  0.61  0.27  0.61  0.31 
HH debt service ratio  128  829  0.94  0.06  0.59  ‐0.10  0.60  0.29  0.42  0.46 
HH debt service ratio 
growth  128  786  0.59  0.29  0.56  0.21  0.59  0.35  0.64  0.32 
Nominal RRE price gap  144  1123  0.95  0.05  0.58  0.00  0.60  0.25  0.51  0.35 
Nominal RRE price 
growth  144  1116  0.92  0.06  0.65  ‐0.21  0.68  ‐0.07  0.74  0.15 
Price to income  136  1026  0.65  0.22  0.55  0.11  0.58  0.27  0.30  0.45 
Price to income growth  135  1004  0.82  0.12  0.70  ‐0.15  0.68  0.13  0.76  0.18 
average  139  1065  0.81  0.13  0.62  ‐0.07  0.66  0.12  0.59  0.24 
Notes: “Observations” is the number of quarterly observations in the evaluation sample. “NTS” is the noise to 
signal ratio and “Relus” is relative usefulness
 
The table shows that the conditional moments approach results in substantially lower noise 
to signal ratios (60-65% on average, compared to 81%) than traditional common thresholds 
when the aversion towards Type I errors is greater. As traditional thresholds are relatively 
sensitive to the preference parameter θ, they strongly reduce Type I errors (4% on average, 
not reported) but also suffer from a very large false alarms rate (78% on average, not 
reported). In contrast, the conditional moments-based thresholds are more robust to the 
specification of the loss function. While they do not bring the Type I error rate down to 
very low levels (on average ranging from 10% in the country-specific and state-dependent 
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version to 27% in the pooled version, not reported), they result, at the same time, in more 
reasonable Type II error rates (on average between 45 and 55%, not reported).  
The larger robustness to the choice of the preference parameter in terms of noise to signal 
ratios comes at a cost of pooled conditional moments resulting in a lower relative 
usefulness than the traditional common approach for θ=0.7. However, the flexibility 
introduced by the country specificities and state dependencies substantially improves 
signalling performance. In fact, the country-specific and state-dependent conditional 
moments again strongly outperform the traditional approach (an average relative 
usefulness of 0.24 compared to 0.13). Hence, accounting for country specificities and state 
dependencies results in better and more robust signalling performance than the traditional 
common thresholds. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of noise to signal ratios and relative usefulness across country/indicator pairs 
θ=0.5 θ=0.7
Noise to signal Noise to signal 
Relative usefulness Relative usefulness 
Notes: The blue (red) lines plot the distribution of noise to signal ratios or relative usefulness of the country-
specific and state-dependent conditional moments (traditional common threshold) across all 196 
country/indicator pairs. 
 
While the results presented above focus on the average improvements in signalling 
performance across all countries in the sample, they do not provide information on how 
these improvements are distributed across countries. Figure 5 therefore plots the 
distribution of noise to signal ratios and relative usefulness across all 196 country/indicator 
pairs. For example, the bottom left-hand panel shows that for θ=0.5, the fraction of 
country/indicator pairs that have a relative usefulness larger than 0.2 exceeds 80% under 
the country-specific and state-dependent conditional moments approach, while this fraction 
is less than 65% for the traditional common approach. Similarly, the top right panel shows 
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that, for θ=0.7, the fraction of country/indicator pairs with a noise to signal ratio lower than 
0.5 amounts to almost 30% for conditional moments, whereas the equivalent figure for the 
traditional common approach is only about 10%.  
The top right panel shows that for a preference parameter θ=0.7, the country-specific and 
state-dependent conditional moments result in lower noise to signal ratios for almost all 
country/indicator pairs, and a lower fraction (10% compared to 25%) of pairs for which the 
noise to signal is equal to or larger than one. For balanced preferences (θ=0.5), the 
conditional moments approach mainly limits the upper part of the noise to signal 
distribution; for the lower part of the distribution, the conditional moments approach 
results in slightly larger noise to signal ratios. As the former dominates the latter, the 
conditional moments approach on average results in a lower noise to signal ratio also for 
balanced preferences. The fraction of pairs for which the noise to signal ratio is equal to or 
larger than one amounts to 3% compared to 7% in the traditional approach.  
The bottom panels of Figure 5 show the overall improvement in relative usefulness across 
country/indicator pairs. Irrespective of the policy maker’s preferences, the country-specific 
and state-dependent conditional moments results in a larger relative usefulness for the large 
majority of country/indicator pairs. Furthermore, both figures show that the country-
specific and state-dependent conditional moments result in a larger fraction of 
country/indicator pairs (80-90% compared to about 70%) having a strictly positive relative 
usefulness.  
Finally, comparing the left-hand panels to the right-hand panels provides further evidence 
for the finding that the country-specific and state-dependent conditional moments result in 
a more stable statistical performance for different values of θ compared to the traditional 
common approach, especially in terms of the noise to signal ratio. That is, the upward 
(downward) shift in the distribution of noise to signal ratios (relative usefulness) when 
moving from balanced preferences to policy preferences with more weight on Type I errors 
is less pronounced for the conditional moments approach than for the traditional one. 
5.2. Out-of-sample robustness 
In practice, policymakers are interested in identifying the build-up of vulnerabilities that 
may lead to future crises. While this in part relies on information regarding the drivers of 
past crises, we perform as a sensitivity analysis an out-of-sample evaluation exercise, 
examining the ability of the model to predict crises not included in the estimation sample. 
Given the heterogeneity in historical crises and the relatively limited amount of crises in 
our data sample, we create 100 different samples based on random draws from the existing 
sample, where each observation has 50% probability of ending up in the estimation sample 
and 50% probability of ending up in the evaluation sample. This results in 100 estimation 
samples and 100 evaluation samples, each containing about half of the observations of the 
original sample. In a first step, the estimation samples are used to determine the thresholds, 
and in a second step the evaluation samples are used to assess the early-warning 
performance of the thresholds determined in the first step. 
Table 7 presents the out-of-sample average signalling performance across the 100 samples 
for the pooled conditional moments and the country-specific and state-dependent 
conditional moments. The results confirm the in-sample finding that, on average, country 
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specificities and state dependencies improve signalling performance, both in terms of 
relative usefulness and noise to signal ratios. Furthermore, while signalling performance is 
somewhat lower compared to the in-sample numbers, out-of-sample performance of the 
conditional moments approach is still satisfactory, especially when country specificities 
and state dependencies are accounted for. In fact, the latter on average performs more or 
less similar to or even better than the in-sample traditional common approach and the in-
sample conditional moments with country dummies. 
 
Table 7: Out-of-sample robustness conditional moments 
    θ=0.5  θ=0.7 
  Observations  CM pooled 
CM country 
dummies and 
state 
dependencies 
CM pooled 
CM country 
dummies and 
state 
dependencies 
Indicator  Pre‐crisis  Normal  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus  NTS  Relus 
Bank credit to GDP 
gap  72  590  0.41  0.27  0.37  0.42  0.68  ‐0.22  0.56  0.13 
Broad credit to GDP 
gap  72  590  0.54  0.24  0.48  0.33  0.67  ‐0.18  0.65  0.00 
Broad HH credit to 
GDP gap  72  506  0.54  0.35  0.41  0.45  0.59  0.16  0.48  0.24 
Nominal bank credit 
growth  72  589  0.57  0.22  0.31  0.38  0.69  ‐0.30  0.68  ‐0.02 
Nominal broad credit 
growth  72  589  0.54  0.21  0.58  0.20  0.70  ‐0.53  0.83  ‐0.20 
Nominal broad HH 
credit growth  70  493  0.60  0.30  0.44  0.31  0.60  0.01  0.71  ‐0.09 
Debt service ratio  68  576  0.44  0.29  0.46  0.38  0.64  ‐0.24  0.60  0.27 
Debt service ratio 
growth  68  572  0.45  0.39  0.48  0.38  0.60  0.19  0.63  0.21 
HH debt service ratio  64  413  0.59  0.27  0.40  0.46  0.59  ‐0.14  0.51  0.30 
HH debt service ratio 
growth  64  392  0.42  0.39  0.47  0.37  0.59  0.20  0.60  0.18 
Nominal RRE price gap  72  560  0.24  0.40  0.33  0.46  0.59  ‐0.06  0.51  0.23 
Nominal RRE price 
growth  72  557  0.47  0.29  0.45  0.32  0.66  ‐0.29  0.74  0.04 
Price to income  68  512  0.37  0.34  0.23  0.57  0.58  0.07  0.34  0.31 
Price to income 
growth  67  501  0.37  0.30  0.48  0.31  0.71  ‐0.18  0.76  0.05 
Average  69  488  0.47  0.30  0.42  0.38  0.63  ‐0.11  0.62  0.12 
Notes: “Observations” is the number of quarterly observations in the evaluation sample. “NTS” is the 
noise to signal ratio and “Relus” is relative usefulness 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Frameworks for macroprudential policy are being developed and progressively coming 
into force. While a coherent implementation of policy instruments may be beneficial, 
structural differences across countries warrant the consideration of a country-specific 
dimension in the operationalisation of macroprudential policy instruments. In this context, 
and given their importance in the systemic risk assessment process, early-warning models 
should be adapted to better reflect country specificities. In fact, models relying on common 
thresholds based on cross-country data often result in poor signalling performance at the 
individual country level. Furthermore, the information content of particular indicator 
developments may differ across different states of the business or the financial cycle.  
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This paper presents a novel yet intuitive methodology to compute country-specific and 
state dependent thresholds for early-warning indicators of banking crises. Using panel data 
on a number of potential early-warning indicators for banking crises for 14 EU countries, 
our results show that the benefits of the conditional moments approach with country 
specificities and state dependencies can be substantial. In particular, compared to 
traditional common thresholds this methodology provides more robust signals and 
improves the early-warning performance at the country-specific level, by accounting for 
country idiosyncrasies and state dependencies, which play an important role in national 
authorities’ macroprudential surveillance. 
For the above reasons and due to its simplicity and flexibility, our methodology can be of 
great value to policymakers, in their periodic evaluation of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
the approach results in a multi-threshold early-warning monitoring framework that 
provides policymakers with more granular signals of different intensity. This granularity 
may be a useful input into both the decision on the timing of policy activation and the 
calibration of policy instruments.  
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